Abstract. Recent personal computers have high-spec CPUs and plenty of memory. The motivation of this study is to take these advantages in designing a tough and fast key-stream generator. Natural controversies on using a large state space for a generator are (1) effectiveness is unclear, (2) slower generation speed, (3) expensive initialization, and (4) costs in a hardware implementation. Our proposal is to combine a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a uniform quasigroup filter with memory of wordsize. We prove theorems which assure the period and the distribution property of such generators, answering to (1). As for (2), the generation speed of a LFSR is independent of the state size. In addition, we propose a filter based on integer multiplication, which is rather fast in modern CPUs. We analyze the algebraic degree of such filters. We answer to (3) by a simple trick to use another small generator to initialize LFSR while outputting. We have no answer to (4), but comment that recent hardwares tend to have larger memory and sophisticated instructions. As a concrete example, we propose CryptMT stream generator with period (no less than) 2 19937 −1, 1241-dimensional equidistribution property, which is sometimes faster than SNOW2.0 in modern CPUs.
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Let B be the set of symbols. Throughout this article, we assume B to be the set of one byte integers, which is identified with F 2 8 , where F 2 = {0, 1} is the two-element field. We consider a stream cipher based on a key-stream generator over B. A generator receives a key k in the set of possible keys K, then generates a sequence of elements b 0 (k), b 1 (k), . . . , b n (k), . . . , ∈ B.
A plain text (a sequence of elements of B) is encrypted by taking bitwise exor with the sequence (b n (k)), and then decrypted by the same method.
Combined Generator
Such a sequence is typically generated by a finite state automaton.
Definition 1. A finite state automaton A without input is a quadruple A = (S, f, O, o), where S is a finite set (the set of states), f : S → S is a function (the state transition function), O is a set (the set of the output symbols), and o : S → O is the output function.
For a given initial state s 0 , A changes the state by the recursion s n := f (s n−1 ) (n = 1, 2, 3, . . .) and generates the sequence
For a stream cipher, we prepare an initializing function init : K → S, and take O := B. By setting s 0 := init(k), the automaton A generates a sequence of elements in B. Its period is bounded by #(S).
To obtain a secure generator, larger #(S) and complicated f and o are desirable. However, if f is complicated, then the analysis of the sequence (such as computing the period and the distribution) often becomes difficult. A typical choice is to choose an F 2 -linear transition function. We take S := F 2 d and choose a linear transition function f . Then, the period can be computed by the linear algebra and polynomial calculus. In particular, the following linear feedback shift register generators (LFSRs) are widely used: S := (F 2 w ) n where w is the word size of the machine (e.g. w = 32 for 32-bit machines), and the transition is
Here g : (F 2 w ) n → F 2 w is a linear function called the feedback function. This state transition is equivalent to the recursion
The output of LFSR is given by
which is not secure as it is. A software implementation technique using a cyclic array ([9, P.28 Algorithm A]) reduces the computation of f to that of g and an index change. Consequently, the computation time is independent of the size of n, which allows a fast generator with huge state space. This type of generator is common for the pseudorandom number generation in Monte Carlo method (PRNG for MC), such as Mersenne Twister (MT19937) [10] , whose period is 2 19937 − 1. As a stream cipher, any linear recurring sequence is vulnerable, so we need to introduce some non-linearity. A conventional method is to choose a "highly non-linear" o : S → O. In this context, o is called a filter.
One of the estimators of the non-linear property of a function is the algebraic degree. Let h i,n (s 0 ) denote the i-th bit of the n-th output b n (s 0 ) of the generator for the initial state s 0 . This is a boolean function, when we consider s 0 ∈ S = F 2 d as d variables of bit. Thus, an adversary can obtain s 0 by solving the simultaneous equations h i,n (s 0 ) = o i,n for unknown s 0 for various i and n, where o i,n are the outputs of the generator observed by the adversary. This is the algebraic attack (see for example [4] , [3] ).
A problem of a linear generator with filter is the following. Since any s n is a linear function of the bits in s 0 = init(k), the algebraic degree of h i,n (s 0 ) is bounded from the above by the algebraic degree of the i-th bit of the filter function o, namely that of the function
To attain the high-speed generation, o i cannot access so many bits in S, and its algebraic degree is bounded by the number of accessed bits. This decreases the merits of the large state space. A filter with memory, which is just a finite state automaton with input, solves this conflict (see §2.3 for its effect on the algebraic degree). 
and the output function is Such an example is famous SNOW stream cipher [5] [6]. The mother generator of SNOW2.0 is a LFSR with 512-bit state space, and its filter has 64-bit state space. Non-linearity is introduced by four copies of one same S-box of 8-bit size, based on arithmetic operations in 2 8 -element filed F 2 8 .
SNOW has no rigorous assurance on the period and the distribution of the generated sequence. We shall introduce the notion of quasigroup filter, which allows to compute the period and distribution property. Let I = S be the set of odd integers in the ring Z/2 32 of integers modulo 2 32 . Let f : I × S → S be the integer multiplication modulo 2 32 . This is a quasigroup (actually the multiplicative group of the ring Z/2 32 ).
Quasigroup Filter
We choose o F : S → O F = B as the function taking the 8 MSBs from the 32-bit integer. on the set of 32-bit integers. We can consider the corresponding multiplicative filter with I = S being the set of 32-bit integers.
Modern CPUs often have a fast integer multiplication for 32-bit integers. We shall discuss mathematical property of such filters in §2.3.
Example 4. (CryptMT1: MT with multiplicative filter)
We choose a LFSR described in (1) as the mother generator A M , with
w . We can choose its parameters so that the period is a large Mersenne prime Q = 2 p − 1 (e.g. p = 19937 as in the case of MT19937 [10] ). By identifying O M as the set of w-bit integers, we can use the multiplicative filter A F described in Example 3. We call this generator as MT19937 with multiplicative filter. The output function o F :
8 is extracting 8 MSBs. This generator is called CryptMT Version 1 (CryptMT1) [11] .
k-dimensional Distribution
Let k be an integer, and let A be an automaton without input as in
(i.e. o (k) maps the state to the next k outputs). Consider the multi-set of the possible output k-tuples for all states:
This is the image of S by o (k) counted with multiplicities.
Definition 6. The output of the automaton A is said to be k-dimensionally equidistributed if the multiplicity of each element in
This type of criteria is commonly used for PRNG for MC: MT19937 as a 32-bit integer generator has this property with k = 623. This criterion is equivalent to the uniformness of the function o (k) defined below.
bijection is uniform, and the composition of uniform mappings is uniform. A filter with memory is uniform if its output function is uniform.
Example 4 is uniform. The next proposition shows that a uniform quasigroup filter increases the dimension of equidistribution by 1. A proof is in Appendix B.1.
Proposition 1. We keep the set-up of Definition 4. Assume that A F is a uniform quasigroup filter. Suppose that the output of
A M is k-dimensionally equidistributed. Then, the combined generator C is (k + 1)-dimensionally equidistributed.
Corollary 1. CryptMT1 explained in Example 4 is 624-dimensionally equidistributed.
We mean by a simple distinguishing attack of order N to choose a real function F with N variables and to detect the deviation of the distribution of the values of F applied to the consecutive N -outputs. If N does not exceed the dimension of the equidistribution, then one can observe no deviation from the true randomness, under the assumption of uniform choice of the initial state.
By this reason, it seems very difficult to apply a correlation attack or a distinguishing attack to such generators. For example, to observe some deviation of MT19937 with multiplicative filter in Example 4, one needs to observe the correlation of outputs with the lag more than 624. Because of the high nonlinearity of the multiplicative filter discussed below, we guess that this would be infeasible. 
A Theorem on the
: S F → O F in S F , namely r = max b∈O F {#(o −1 F (b))}/#(S F ). If r −(k+1) > q · (#(S F )) 2 ,
then the period of the output sequence of C is a nonzero multiple of Q.
A proof is given in Appendix B.2.
Example 5. For MT19937 with multiplicative filter, this theorem shows that any bit in the output sequence has a period being a multiple of the prime 2 19937 − 1, as follows. We have Q = 2 19937 − 1 and
m is extracting some m bits from the 32-bit integers, then r = 2 w−m /2 w = 2 −m . The inequality condition in the theorem is now
and hence if this holds, then the m-bit output sequence has a period which is a multiple of Q.
In the case of MT19937 and the multiplicative filter, since k = 623 and w = 32, the above inequality holds for any m ≥ 1, hence any bit of the output has a period at least 2 19937 − 1. 
. , N ), and its value is defined as the s-th digit (from the LSB) of the 2-adic expansion of the product
The algebraic degree of m s,N is bounded from below by
A proof is given in Appendix B.3. This proposition gives the algebraic degree of the multiplicative filter, with respect to the inputs x 1 , . . . , x N . This proposition implies that we should use MSBs of the multiplicative filter. On the other hand, using 8 MSBs among 32-bit integers as in Example 2 seems to have enough high algebraic degree. We check this using a toy model in Appendix A.
A Fast Initialization of a Large State Space
Consider LFSR in (1) as a mother generator. Its state space is an array of w-bit integers with size n. We need to give initial values to such a large array in the initialization. If one wants to encrypt a much shorter message than n, then this is not efficient. A possible solution is to use a PRNG with relatively small state space (called the booter) which can be quickly initialized, and use it to generate the initial array x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , and at the same time, its outputs are passed to the filter for key-stream generation. If the message length is smaller than n, then the mother generator is never used: the outputs of the booter are used as the output of the mother generator. If the message length exceeds n, then the first n outputs of the booter are used as the outputs of the mother generator, and at the same time for filling up the state space of the mother generator. After the state space is filled up, the mother generator starts to work. See Appendix C for more detail.
The first outputs come from the booter. One may argue why not using the booter forever, without using the mother generator. The answer is that we do not need to care about the attacks to the booter based on a long output stream.
A Concrete Example Using 128-bit Instructions
Recent CPUs often have Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions. These instructions treat a quadruple of 32-bit integers at one time. We propose a LFSR and a uniform quasigroup filter, based on 128-bit instructions, named CryptMT Version 3 (CryptMT3) in the rest of this paper. CryptMT3 is one of the phase 3 candidates in eSTREAM stream cipher competition [13] . We shall describe the generation algorithm below.
SIMD Fast MT
In the LFSR (1), we assume that each x i is a 128-bit integer or equivalently a vector in F 2 128 . We choose the following recursion: n = 156 and [6] ).
A Modified Multiplicative Filter
Our filter A F has I F = S F being the set of 128-bit integers, and O F being the set of 64-bit integers, as described below. For given 128-bit integers y ∈ I F and x ∈ S F , we define
Here, the notation ">> 32 1" means to consider a 128-bit integer as a quadruple of 32-bit integers, and then shift each of them to the right by 1 , 1, 2, 3) . The operation applied to y is an invertible linear transformation, hence is bijective. Since× is bi-bijective, so is f F . The purpose to introduce the permutation-shift is to mix the information among four 32-bit memories in the filter, and to send the information of the upper bits to the lower bits. This supplements the multiplication, which lacks this direction of transfer of the information.
The output function is 
This means that y is considered as a quadruple of 32-bit integers, and for each of them, we take the exor of the MSB 16 bits and LSB 16 bits.
Thus we obtain four 16-bit integers, which is the output 64-bit integer (see Figure 3) . To obtain 8-bit integers, we dissect it into 8 pieces.
CryptMT3 is the combination of the SIMD Fast MT ( §4.1) and this filter. Initialization by the booter is explained in Appendix C. 
Speed Comparison
Comparison of the speed of generation for stream ciphers is a delicate problem: it depends on the platform, compilers, and so on. Here we compare the number of cycles consumed per byte, by CryptMT3, HC256, SOSEMANUK, Salsa20, Dragon (these are the five candidates in eS-TREAM software cipher phase 3 permitting 256-bit Key), SNOW2.0 and AES (counter-mode), in three different CPUs: Intel Core 2 Duo, AMDAthlon X2, and Motorola PowerPC G4, using eSTREAM timing-tool [7] . The data are listed in Table 1 . Actually, they are copied from Bernstein's page [2] . The number of cycles in Key set-up and IV set-up are also listed.
CryptMT3 is the fastest in generation in Intel Core 2 Duo CPU, reflecting the efficiency of SIMD operations in this newer CPU. CryptMT3 is slower in Motorola PowerPC. This is because AltiVec (SIMD of PowerPC) lacks 32-bit integer multiplication (so we used non-SIMD multiplication instead). 
Conclusions
We proposed combination of a LFSR and a uniform quasigroup filter as a stream cipher in software. As a concrete example, we implemented CryptMT3 generator. CryptMT3 is as fast as SNOW2.0 and faster than AES counter-mode for recent CPUs. CryptMT3 satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, and it can be proved to have the astronomical period ≥ 2 19937 −1 and the 156-dimensional equidistribution property as a 64-bit integer generator (and hence 1241-dimensional equidistribution property as a 8-bit integer generator). CryptMT3 uses integer multiplication instead of an S-box. This is an advantage over generators with large look-up tables for fast software implementation of the S-box, such as SNOW or AES, where cache-timing attacks might be applied [1] .
A toy model of CryptMT3 shows high algebraic degrees and nonlinearity for the multiplicative filter, which supports its effectiveness.
where >> 1 denotes the one-bit shift-right, (x j &1) denotes the LSB of x j , a = 1010001001111000 is a constant 16-bit integer, and (x j &1) · a denotes the product of the scalar (x j &1) ∈ F 2 and the vector a.
Then it is filtered by
where (x j |1) denotes x j with LSB set to 1. We put y 0 = 1, and compute the algebraic degree of each of the 16 bits in the outputs y 1 ∼ y 16 , each regarded as a polynomial function with 16 variables being the bits in x 0 . The result is listed in Table 2 . The lower six bits of the table clearly show the pattern 0, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, which suggests that the lower bound 2 s−2 for s ≥ 2 given in Proposition 2 would be tight, when the iterations are many enough. On the other hand, eighth bit and higher are "saturated" to the upper bound 16, after 12 generations. We expect that the algebraic degrees for CryptMT3 would behave even better, since its filter is modified. So, if we consider each bit of the internal state of CryptMT3 as a variable, then the algebraic degree of the bits in the outputs will be near to 19937, after some steps of generations. Table 3 , and each value is near to 2 16−1 . This suggests that there would be no good linear approximation of CryptMT3. 
B Proof of Theorems and Propositions

B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider the k-tuple output function of the mother generator o (2). Then, the k-dimensional equidistribution property is equivalent to the uniformness of o
where the second map µ is given by
where y i 's are inductively defined by
is the direct product of k + 1 copies of o F . The quasigroup property of f F implies the bijectivity of µ. The last map is uniform. Since the composition of uniform mappings is uniform, we obtain the proof.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We may replace S M with the orbit starting from s 0 . Then, replace S M with its quotient set where two states are identified if the output sequences from them are identical. Thus, we may assume #(S M ) = P , where P is the period of the output sequence of A M . In this proof, we do not consider multi-sets. Consider the k-tuple output function o 
The period P of the state transition of C is a multiple of P = Qq. Since the state size of C is P × #(S F ), P = Qm holds for some m ≤ q#(S F ). Consequently, p is a divisor of Qm. If p is not a multiple of Q, then p divides m and p ≤ q#(S F ). Thus we have
contradicting to the assumption.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let h(c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) be a boolean function as in Definition 2, and h = T ⊂{1,2,...,n} a T c T be its algebraic normal form. The following lemma is well known.
Proof of Proposition
Proof. For s = 2, the claim is easy to check. We assume s ≥ 3. Case 1. s − 2 ≤ log 2 N . In this case, it suffices to prove that the algebraic degree is at least 2 s−2 . Take However, the well-known formula
implies that the binary coefficients are even except for the both end, so the summation is equal to the s-th bit of 3 2 s−2 .
A well-known lemma says that if x ≡ 1 mod 2 i and x ≡ 1 mod 2 i+1 for i ≥ 2, then x 2 ≡ 1 mod 2 i+1 and x 2 ≡ 1 mod 2 i+2 . By applying this lemma inductively, we know that
This means that s-th bit of 3 2 s−2 is 1, and the proposition is proved. Case 2. s − 2 > log 2 (N ) . In this case, we put t := log 2 (N ) + 2, and hence s > t and 2 t−2 ≤ N . We apply the above arguments for T = {1, 2, . . . , 2 t−2 }, but this time instead of c 1,i , we activate
The same argument as above reduces the non-vanishing of the coefficient of the term c s−t+2,1 · · · c s−t+2,2 t−2 to the non-vanishing of
Again, only the both ends m = 0 and m = 2 t−2 can survive, and the above summation is the s-th bit of (1 + 2 s−t+2 ) t−2 . Since s − t + 2 ≥ 2, the lemma mentioned above implies that
which implies that its s-th bit is 1.
C The key, IV, and the Booter
The design of the booter (see §3) goes independently of the key-stream generator. However, as the referees pointed out, we need to specify one to have a complete description of the generator. Thus, we here include the booter of CryptMT3 for self-containedness. The booter is described in Figure 4 . We choose an integer H later in §C.1. The state space of the booter is a shift register consisting of H 128-bit integers. We choose an initial state x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x H−1 and the initial value a 0 of the accumulator (a 128-bit memory) as described in the next section. Then, the state transition is given by the recursion where
The notation + 32 (− 32 ) denotes the addition (subtraction, respectively) modulo 2 32 for each of the four 32-bit integers in the 128-bit integers. The output of the j-th step is x j + 32 x H+j−2 . As described in Figure 4 , the booter consists of an automaton with three inputs and two outputs of 128-bit integers, together with a shift register. In the implementation, the shift register is taken in an array of 128-bit integers with the length 2H + 2 + n, where n = 156 is the size of the state array of SFMT. This redundancy of the length is for the idling, as explained below.
C.1 Key and IV Set-up
We assume that both the IV and the Key are given as arrays of 128-bit integers. The size of each array is chosen by user, from 1 to 16. Thus, the Key-size is chosen from 128 bits to 2048 bits, as well as the IV-size.
We claim the security level that is the same with the minimum of the Key-size and the IV-size.
We concatenate the IV and the Key to a single array, and then it is copied twice to an array, as described in Figure 5 . To break the symme- Fig. 5 . Beginning of Key and IV set-up. The IV-array and Key-array are concatenated and copied to an array twice. Then, a constant is added to the bottom of the second copy of the key to break a possible symmetry. The automaton is described in Figure 4 .
try, we add a constant 128-bit integer (846264, 979323, 265358, 314159) (denoting four 32-bit integers in a decimal notation, coming from π) to the bottom row of the second copy of the key (add means + 32 ). Now, the size H of the shift register in the booter is set to be 2 × (IV-size + Key-size (in bits))/128, namely, the twice of the number of 128-bit integers contained in the IV and the Key. For example, if the IVsize and the Key-size are both 128 bits, then H = 2 × (1 + 1) = 4. The automaton in the booter described in Figure 4 is equipped on this array, as shown in Figure 5 . The accumulator of the booter-automaton is set to (the top row of the key array) | (1, 1, 1, 1) , that is, the top row is copied to the accumulator and then the LSB of each of the 32-bit integers in the accumulator is set to 1.
At the first generation, the automaton reads three 128-bit integers from the array, and write the output 128-bit integer at the top of the array. The feedback to the shift register is written into the (H + 1)-st entry of the array. For the next generation, we shift the automaton downwards by one, and proceed in the same way.
For idling, we iterate this for H + 2 times. Then, the latest modified row in the array is the (2H + 2)-nd row, and it is copied to the 128-bit memory in the filter of CryptMT3. We discard the top H + 2 entries of the array. This completes the Key and IV set-up. Figure 6 shows the state after the set-up. After the set-up, the booter produces 128-bit integer outputs, at most n times. Let L be the number of bits in the message. If L ≤ n × 64, then we do not need the mother generator. We generate the necessary number of 128-bit integers by the booter, and pass them to the filter to obtain the required outputs. If L ≥ n × 64, then, we generate n 128-bit integers by the booter, and pass them to the filter to obtain n 64-bit integers, which are used as the first outputs. At the same time, these n 128-bit integers are recorded in the array, and they are passed to SFMT as the initial state.
To eliminate the possibility of shorter period than 2 19937 − 1, we set the 32 MSBs of the first row of the state array of SFMT to the magic number 0x4d734e48 in the hexadecimal representation, as explained in §4.1. That is, we start the recursion (3) of SFMT with x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 being the array of length n generated by the booter (with 32 bits replaced with a magic constant), and then SFMT produces x n , x n+1 , . . .. Since x n might be easier to guess because of the constant part in the initial state, we skip x n and pass the 128-bit integers x n+1 , x n+2 , . . . to the filter.
